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Clarett v. National Football League: Defining the NonStatutory Labor Exception to Antitrust Law as it pertains
to Restraints primarily focused in Labor Markets and
Restraints primarily focused in Business Markets
RONALD TERK SIA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal antitrust law and national labor law set forth two conflicting
policies that have created a periodic drama for sports fans concerned that
their favorite sports will suffer a cataclysmic court room battle impairing
the quality of the game.1 The Supreme Court interpreted federal antitrust
and labor law to implicitly exclude antitrust liability for certain collective
bargaining labor related activities under the non-statutory labor exception
to antitrust law.2 This absence of explicit guidance has led to a split in the
circuits where courts have formulated their own interpretations of these
colliding national policies. In 1996, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 3 attempted to further clarify the scope of this exemption and
ultimately held that national antitrust and labor policies favored the application of the exception when the alleged restraints were in labor markets
defined by collective bargaining. In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Clarett v. National Football League4
that Brown reaffirmed the Second Circuit position that restraints resulting
from the collective bargaining process and primarily impacting the labor
market were subject to the non-statutory labor exception to antitrust law.
In 2003, Maurice Clarett, a sophomore collegiate running back for
Ohio State University (“OSU”) announced that he intended to enter the
* JD Candidate, 2006, Franklin Pierce Law Center, Concord, N.H.; B.S., Chemical Engineering,
2000, Tufts University, Medford, Mass. I would like to thank the Pierce Law Review Board and Editorial Staff for their assistance and helpful comments in putting this article together. I would also like to
thank Jeffrey Roy, Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center, Pierce Law Review Faculty Advisor,
and Peter Foley, Adjunct Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center, for their learned guidance and
thoughtful suggestions.
1. See e.g. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 233-34 (1996).
2. Id. (noting that earlier decisions by the same court set forth this exception, but declined to set
forth a clear bright line rule by which to apply the exemption).
3. 518 U.S. at 250 (holding that the non-statutory labor exemption applied beyond impasse and
until the collective bargaining process was terminated or completed but declining to explicitly state
how that is triggered).
4. 369 F.3d 124, 130-31, 135 (2d Cir. 2004).
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2004 National Football League (“NFL”) draft. The NFL declared that
Clarett was ineligible for the rookie draft stating that the NFL player Eligibility Rules required all players to have exceeded a three year post-high
school graduation requirement. Clarett subsequently sued the NFL, claiming that the Eligibility Rules worked as a violation of antitrust law by unreasonably restraining him from pursuing a career in the NFL.5
The National Football League Management Committee (“NFLMC”)
and the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”) are contractually obligated to the terms and conditions of the current collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA”).6 The CBA references the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, which requires all draft applicants to meet a minimum of
having exhausted at least three football seasons after their high school
graduation (the “Eligibility Rules”).7 Clarett’s case went to trial in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, resulting in a finding of an antitrust violation and an injunction ordering the NFL
to instate Clarett for the draft.8
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the district court
holding that the Eligibility Rules violated antitrust law.9 Notably, the court
interpreted the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust law to require
deference to the labor law remedies and policy where the alleged injury is
primarily focused in a labor market.10
Clarett’s desire to enter professional organized labor is indicative of
the ongoing desire by many younger athletes to forego formal postsecondary education and to enter the world of professional sports.11 Over
the past several decades, there has been a general relaxing of age-based
player eligibility rules in many professional sports (including the 1993
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, a move from a four year post-high
school requirement to the current three year requirement).12 Commentators

5. Id. at 129.
6. Id. at 126-27.
7. Id. at 128.
8. Clarett v. National Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
9. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143.
10. Id. at 142-43.
11. See infra pt. II(A) and accompanying text (briefly discussing the increasing success of younger
rookies becoming all-star athletes in various professional sports for example, the NBA drafts of high
school players including Kobe Bryant and LeBron James).
12. See generally Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1204-05, 1207 (1971) (finding that NBA eligibility rule as a per se violation of antitrust law); Robert D. Koch, 4th and Goal: Maurice Clarett Tackles the NFL Eligibility Rule, 24 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 291, 294 (2004) (discussing NFL eligibility rules
going from a four year to three year requirement); Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. MacKinnon,
Professional Football’s Draft Eligibility Rule: The Labor Exception and the Antitrust Laws, 33 Emory
L.J. 375, 376-77 (1984) (analyzing the now dissolved U.S. Football League’s signing of Herschel
Walker in 1983, as an exception to its own eligibility rules).
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continue to opine that the NFL Eligibility Rules should be abolished.13
Had this happened, Clarett would have likely entered the NFL in the 2004
draft and not spent over a year away from organized football; instead
Clarett remained depressed by the Second Circuit decision and prepared
himself for the 2005 draft.14 Still, the policies behind the national antitrust
and labor laws have set forth principles which have been interpreted by the
courts to exempt certain labor issues from federal antitrust law.
Clarett noted the distinction between its own circuit law (as supported
by the 1996 Brown decision) which interpreted labor laws as “waiv[ing]
antitrust liability for restraints on competition imposed through the collective bargaining process, so long as such restraints operate primarily in a
labor market characterized by collective bargaining” and differing interpretations as set forth by Eighth Circuit law.”15 Clarett noted the distinction
between its own circuit law (as supported by the 1996 Brown decision) and
differing interpretations as set forth by the Eighth Circuit.16 Clarett held
that the Eligibility Rules were a mandatory subject of bargaining and a
restraint created by the collective bargaining agreement; the court further
found that this restraint operated primarily in a labor market, not a business
market.17 Accordingly, Clarett interpreted national antitrust and labor policy to dictate that the issue was exempt from antitrust violation and under
the jurisdiction of labor law and the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”).18
This note will analyze the Second Circuit’s ruling and rationale in light
of the relevant governing law and national policies between antitrust law
and labor law. Part II will discuss the general trend of player-raised antitrust challenges to restraint cases in professional sports, setting the stage
for an aspiring football player like Clarett to challenge the NFL Eligibility
Rules. In Part III, this note will discuss the facts, procedural history and
outcome of Clarett. Part IV will discuss the historical background under
13. See Shuana Itri, Maurice Clarett v. National Football League, Inc.: An Analysis of Clarett’s
Challenge to the Legality of the NFL’s Draft Eligibility Rule Under Antitrust Law, 11 Vill. Sports &
Ent. L.J. 303, 304 (2004); Koch, supra n. 12, at 347-48.
14. See e.g. Tom Friend & Ryan Hockensmith, Clarett claims cash, cars among benefits, ESPN,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1919059 (Nov. 9, 2004, 5:51 p.m. EDT) (discussing
Clarett’s status a year following the Second Circuit ruling); Andrew Mason, Final Pick, Fresh Start:
Shanahan gives Clarett “Clean State” after Selection, http://www.denverbroncos.com/page.php?id=
334&storyID=4094 (April 23, 2005) (discussing the two years Clarett spent away from organized
football and his potential as the Denver Bronco’s notorious 101st 2005 Draft Pick).
15. 369 F.3d at 137-38 (quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 235).
16. Id. at 134 (declining to follow the law set forth in Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)
as this case had not been adopted by the Supreme Court, or earlier Second Circuit cases); see infra pt.
VI and accompanying text (discussing Clarett’s recognition of binding precedent set forth by the Supreme Court and relevant Second Circuit law).
17. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139, 141.
18. Id. at 134, 139-41.
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which Clarett was ruled. Part V will analyze how courts have distinguished between restraints created through the collective bargaining process which primarily impact the labor market as opposed to those that primarily impact business markets. In Part VI, this note will analyze Clarett’s
interpretation of Brown in distinguishing labor and business markets, and
discuss how the non-statutory labor exception should be applied to labor
market restraints as compared to business market restraints. Finally, it will
outline the legacy that Clarett provides for future player-raised challenges
in similar situations.
II. HISTORY REGARDING PLAYER ELIGIBILITY RULES
Contemporary sports have seen an influx of young talent opting for a
chance at playing in the big leagues earlier at the expense of obtaining
higher education.19 Many dream of playing professional sports—dreams
often prohibited by player eligibility rules. In situations where the
restraints are not argued to have been protected by non-statutory labor
exception, antitrust law has been seen to set its talons into eligibility
rules.20
A. National Basketball Association
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Haywood v. National Basketball
Association, 21 the first successful player antitrust case regarding eligibility
rules in the National Basketball Association (“NBA”). A professional basketball team signed Haywood before his college class graduated. At the
time, the NBA eligibility rules required players to have surpassed the
graduation date of their college class and the NBA Commissioner moved
to block Haywood’s ability to join the team.22 Haywood won his district
court antitrust claim by showing that the restraint was a group boycott and

19. All-star celebrity athletes like Kobe Bryant and LeBron James are known for bypassing college
and jumping directly from high school into multi-million dollar professional contracts and lucrative
sponsorship deals, bypassing college. See ESPN, The List: Most Hyped Phenoms, http://espn.go.com/
page2/s/list/hypedphenoms.html (accessed Sept. 29, 2005). And the players keep getting younger,
“InterMilan offered Adu a $750,000-a-year deal just to build a relationship. Oh, and Adu was offered
the contract and [sic] the age of 10!” Ben Shlesinger, Adu Plays First Pro Game,
http://www.thesentinel.com/print/284310758319126.php (accessed Sept. 29, 2005).
20. See infra pt. II(A) and accompanying text (discussing cases where leagues and employers either
failed or declined to raise labor related defenses despite the presence of collective bargaining agreements).
21. 401 U.S. at 1205.
22. Id.
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therefore a per se antitrust violation.23 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reinstated the district court injunction, temporarily forbidding the
league from taking sanctions against Haywood’s team for signing him.24
In the aftermath of Haywood, several district courts found federal antitrust violations in player eligibility rules that were considered bars to entry
into the market. These violations were only found where the facts demonstrated that the rules were not reached through the collective bargaining
process.25
Following Haywood’s reinstatment of the district court order granting
injunctive relief in favor of the player, the district court ruled Denver
Rockets v. All-Pro Management26 in favor of Haywood and the union. The
district court held that the NBA Bylaws were a group boycott and therefore
illegal per se.27 Section 2.05 of the NBA Bylaws prohibited any qualified
players from negotiating with any NBA team until four years after his high
school class graduation.28 The court ruled that the restraint, absent any
option for appeal, constituted a group boycott within antitrust laws, which
is a primary concerted refusal to deal wherein actors at one level (NBA
teams) refused to deal with actors at another level (those ineligible under
four year rule).29
B. Unites States Football League
In another district court case, Boris v. United States Football
League, 30 Boris, an aspiring football player, was prevented from playing
in the United States Football League (“USFL”) because he failed to meet
any of the three requirements of the league rule. The court found as a matter of uncontested fact that the USFL teams were economic competitors
and granted partial summary judgment to Boris’s allegation that the rule

23. Id. at 1204-05.
24. Id. at 1206-07 (noting that a quick resolution was required due to the immediate need to determine if Haywood could play for a Seattle NBA team in the ongoing playoffs).
25. See infra pts. II(A)-(B) and accompanying text (discussing district court cases which found
player eligibility restraints to be antitrust violations where labor law exceptions were not raised in
defense).
26. 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066-67 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
27. Id. at 1067 (recognizing a group boycott as a violation of antitrust laws).
28. Id. at 1055.
29. Id. at 1058, 1066.
30. 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, 3, 7 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (requiring “1) all college football eligibility
of such player has expired, or 2) at least five (5) years shall have elapsed since the player first entered
or attended a recognized junior college, college or university or 3) such player received a diploma from
a recognized college or university”).
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constituted a group boycott and was therefore a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. 31
C. World Hockey Association
In 1977, a district court heard a similar antitrust claim, this time with
professional hockey, Linseman v. World Hockey Association,32 and held
that the eligibility rules were a group boycott and therefore illegal per se.
Linseman, a 19-year-old amateur, was prevented from playing by the
World Hockey Association (“WHA”) eligibility rules, and he subsequently
challenged them as an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act.33 The WHA regulation prohibited persons under the age of
twenty from playing professional hockey for any team within the WHA.34
The district court ruled in favor of Linseman, finding a “great likelihood”
that the regulation would qualify as a classic case of a per se illegal concerted boycott without redemption by either an act of state doctrine or an
economic compulsion argument.35
D. New Era of Interpretation
Although the judicial system has been able to find antitrust violations
in player eligibility rules that acted to restrain player eligibility, these cases
were ruled in an era considered by many to have a judicial system, fueled
with an antedated interpretation of antitrust law.36 Further, the leagues in
the above cases either failed or declined to rely on their collective bargaining agreements to receive protection under national labor laws. In more
recent cases, the leagues (and players) have relied on the labor exceptions
to antitrust law in order to deflect many of these antitrust charges. As will
be discussed later in the analysis of the legal background, the Supreme
Court has interpreted relevant antitrust and labor statutes to require a nonstatutory labor exception to antitrust cases where certain conditions are
met.37 This interpretation, lacking clear delineation upon its pronouncement, has led to a split in the circuits and many highly controversial deci31. Id. at 5, 8.
32. 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320, 1323 (D. Conn. 1977).
33. Id. at 1317.
34. Id. at 1318.
35. Id. at 1325.
36. See e.g. Paul C. Weiler & Gary R. Roberts, Sports and the Law: Text, Cases, Problems 234,
200-01 (3d ed., West 2004) (stating that the federal judges who decided the above three cases applied
“rather strange versions of the per se antitrust ban on group boycotts . . . an approach clearly incompatible with the Rule of Reason now used in all appellate sports cases”).
37. See infra pt. IV(B) and accompanying text.
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sions impacting the nature of professional sports and the labor industry in
general.38
In the landmark labor antitrust case of Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the intersection between antitrust and
labor law by setting forth the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust
law. Brown prohibits the blind application of antitrust law to the results of
the collective bargaining processes and instead requires courts to determine
whether the restraints should fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRB.39
III. CLARETT’S CASE AGAINST THE NFL
A. Facts
Former OSU star running back Maurice Clarett has accomplished an
impressive resume in the amateur football arena.40 Unfortunately, prior to
the start of the 2004 college football season Clarett was suspended from
collegiate football, resulting in his attempt to turn professional by entering
the 2004 NFL draft.41 Clarett faced the NFL Eligibility Rules, which are
referenced in the current NFL CBA and effectively prohibit any players
from entering into the annual draft unless they have exhausted a period of
three years (or three full football seasons) after their high school graduation.42
The NFL is the premier professional football league in North America
and has, since 1925, required all would-be players to wait a “sufficient
period of time after graduating high school to accommodate and encourage
college attendance before entering the NFL draft.”43 The current CBA was
agreed upon by the NFL and the players union, NFLPA, in 1993 and is in
force until 2007.44 Within the terms of the CBA are three separate provisions which reference the NFL Constitution and Bylaws (containing the
Eligibility Rules), most notably Article III Section 1, stating:
38. See infra pt. IV(C) and accompanying text (discussing the differing interpretations of the nonstatutory labor exception as recognized by the Eighth Circuit and the Second Circuit).
39. See e.g. Steven D. Buchholz, Run, Kick, and (Im)passe: Expanding Employers’ Ability to Unilaterally Impose Conditions of Employment after Impasse in Brown v. Pro Football, 81 Minn. L. Rev.
1201, 1226-27 (1997) (stating that the Supreme Court recognized the congressional intent of labor law
and policy and by averring that issues of unfair labor practice properly fall under the jurisdiction of the
NLRB).
40. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125-26 (noting Clarett’s accomplishments to include Big Ten Freshman of
the Year, being a freshman starting running back in a league known for its prolific running backs, and
leading his team to victory at a national championship at the 2003 Fiesta Bowl).
41. Id. (the reasons for Clarett’s suspension controversial but irrelevant to the legal issue at hand).
42. Id. at 126, 128.
43. Id. at 126.
44. Id. at 127.
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[T]here will be no change in the terms and conditions of this
Agreement without mutual consent . . . if any proposed change in
the NFL Constitution and Bylaws during the term of this Agreement could significantly affect the terms and conditions of employment of NFL players, then the NFLMC will give the NFLPA
notice of and negotiate the proposed change in good faith.45
In 1993, the Bylaws included Article XII, entitled “Eligibility of Players,” which prohibited teams from drafting any players who had not exhausted their college football eligibility, graduated college, or been out of
high school for five football seasons.46 In May of 1993, representatives of
the NFL and NFLPA signed a letter confirming acceptance of the then
current Constitution and Bylaws.47 The Special Eligibility Rules were accepted into the Constitution and Bylaws and effectively into the CBA with
no apparent contention by the NFLPA.48 Notably, after the Constitution
and Bylaws were revised, evidence was submitted to show that the terms
were accepted by the NFLPA through the collective bargaining process.49
Nearly ten years into the CBA, Article XII was amended to (1) require that
all potential players have exceeded four seasons prior to being eligible for
draft selection, with a right to appeal to the Commissioner for special eligibility and (2) reference a 1990 memorandum by the Commissioner, defining applications for special eligibility as being “accepted only from college players as to whom three full college seasons have elapsed since their
high school graduation.”50
B. Procedural History
On September 23, 2003, Maurice Clarett challenged the Eligibility
Rules as an unreasonable restraint on his entry into the professional football market and, therefore, subject to antitrust violation. The NFL responded by arguing that the Eligibility Rules were agreed upon through

45. Id. at 127-28 (stating the references as (1) within the Scope of Agreement - providing the
NFLPA notice of any proposed changes to the Constitution and Bylaws with the ability to good faith
negotiations; (2) that neither party will be involved in suit related to existing provisions of the Constitution and Bylaws; and (3) any grievances arising under the Constitution or Bylaws pertaining to terms
and conditions of employment are subject to the grievance procedures detailed in the CBA).
46. Id. at 127.
47. Id. at 128 (citing declaration by Peter Ruocco, Senior V.P. of Labor Relations at NFLMC, that
leading “to the [collective bargaining agreement], the [challenged] eligibility rule itself was the subject
of collective bargaining”).
48. Id.
49. Id. (noting that the declaration of Mr. Ruocco, averred that the Eligibility Rules themselves were
the subject of collective bargaining).
50. Id. (citing to 1990 memorandum, emphasis in original).
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collective bargaining and therefore protected by the antitrust non-statutory
exemption and that Clarett lacked standing to bring the suit.51
The court rejected the defenses raised by the NFL.52 First, the district
court applied the Mackey Factors, a three-part test set forth by the Eighth
Circuit in 1976, and did not find a non-statutory exemption.53 The court
held that the Eligibility Rules were (1) not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; (2) only impacted potential players who were strangers to
the bargaining agreement; and (3) were not shown to be the product of
arm’s-length negotiations.54 Next the district court rejected the standing
defense, holding that a restraint on a NFL player’s ability to work is a sufficient injury for antitrust purposes.55
Proceeding to the merits of Clarett’s claim, the district court applied
the Rule of Reason,56 and found that the Eligibility Rules were so blatantly
anticompetitive that they warranted only a “quick look,” resulting in a finding that the restraint was unreasonable because of the availability of less
restrictive alternative means.57 On February 5, 2004, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Clarett and ordered the NFL to instate Clarett for the 2004 draft.58 The NFL appealed and on March 30,
2004 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed to
hear the appeal less than one week before the NFL draft.59
C. Second Circuit’s Ruling
The issue before the Second Circuit was whether federal labor laws favoring and governing the collective bargaining process precluded the application of the antitrust laws to the NFL Eligibility Rules.60 The Second
51. Id. at 129.
52. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
53. Id. at 391. The Mackey Factors being an inquiry as to (1) whether the parties involved were
parties to collective bargaining agreements; (2) whether the agreements were pertaining to mandatory
subjects of bargaining; and (3) whether the agreement was product of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations. If the three factors are answered in the affirmative, the restraint would be subject to the nonstatutory labor exception. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614-15; see also infra pt. IV(C) and accompanying text
regarding Mackey.
54. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393-97.
55. Id. at 398.
56. Id. at 405. Further, the Rule of Reason is a merit based test weighing anticompetitive effects
against procompetitive effects related to an alleged antitrust violation. Where anticompetitive effects
outweigh any procompetitive effects, the court must find an antitrust violation. Natl. Socy. of Prof.
Engrs. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) [hereinafter Prof. Engrs.].
57. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at. 408-10 (explaining that certain anticompetitive effects were so
strong that the court need perform only a cursory and brief inquiry into the Rule of Reason balance
before finding an antitrust violation).
58. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 130, 138.
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Circuit answered in the affirmative, and reversed and remanded, vacating
the district court order that made Clarett eligible for the 2004 NFL draft.61
In analyzing this issue, the Second Circuit reiterated the position that
this area of law is at the crossroads of antitrust and labor law, “an area of
law marked more by controversy than by clarity.”62 In addressing the issue
on appeal (whether the non-statutory exemption applied to the Eligibility
Rules), Judge Sotomayor provided a clarification of the relevant antitrust
and labor laws, precedent and policies.63
The Second Circuit reviewed Supreme Court precedent which posited,
but never precisely delineated, the boundaries of the non-statutory exception. In doing so, the unanimous opinion by the three-judge panel declined
to follow the Mackey Factors set forth by the Eighth Circuit and instead
relied on its own binding precedent to clarify the groundwork set forth by
the Supreme Court over the past half century.64 Judge Sotomayor distinguished Clarett from Mackey (which has never been adopted by the Second Circuit) and Supreme Court cases – involving antitrust claims raised
by employers in the presence of labor-management relations governed by
collective bargaining agreements65 – by noting that unlike those cases,
Clarett involved a claim by an employee (albeit a potential employee) and
not a competing employer.66 Clarett noted that “to permit antitrust suits
against sports leagues on the ground that their concerted action imposed a
restraint upon the labor market would seriously undermine many of the
policies embodied by these labor laws.”67 Further, Clarett interpreted the
1996 Supreme Court decision in Brown, relying on earlier Second Circuit
cases, setting forth a rule that the non-statutory labor exception applied
where professional athletes brought antitrust claims against their employers
for any restraints resulting from the collective bargaining process concerning mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.68
Clarett ruled that the non-statutory exception shielded the Eligibility
Rules from antitrust violation and declined to venture further into an analysis on the merits of antitrust law. The court dismissed Clarett’s claim of a
61. Id. at 130, 138, 143.
62. Id. at 130 (quoting itself in Wood, 809 F.2d at 959, from 17 years earlier).
63. See id. at 131 (inferring the definition of the non-statutory exemption from Brown).
64. Id. at 134 (stating that Mackey “does not comport with the Supreme Court’s most recent treatment of the non-statutory labor exemption in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996)”).
65. Infra pt. IV(B) discussing Supreme Court precedent in detail.
66. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134 (explaining through footnote 14 that other jurisdictions have followed
the same pre-Brown interpretation that non-statutory labor exceptions require stronger deferral to labor
law for restraints felt predominantly in labor markets).
67. Id. at 135.
68. Id. at 138 (concluding that “our prior decisions in Caldwell, Williams, and Wood . . . fully comport – in approach and result – with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, we regard them as controlling authority”).
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per se antitrust violation by noting that Clarett’s ineligibility was the result
of the NFL CBA which invoked the application of federal labor laws and
policies. The court proceeded to address the NFL appeal according to judicial interpretation of the non-statutory labor exception to antitrust law.69
Further, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court’s failure to
classify the Eligibility Rules as a mandatory subject of bargaining, reasoning that precedent supported a finding that terms of employment are mandatory subjects and the direct relationship that employee competition had
on wages and working conditions for all employees.70 Next, the court held
that the Eligibility Rules were mandatory subjects of bargaining because
they influenced terms of initial employment, wages and working conditions and were a part of the CBA.71 Lastly, the court addressed the relationship between the CBA and the Eligibility Rules and concluded that
Eligibility Rules were a mandatory bargaining subject and therefore exempt from antitrust law; the court explained that the NFLPA acquiescence
to the 2003 amendment served as an acceptance in accordance with the
collective bargaining process.72
Clarett observed that to allow an antitrust suit would not violate stare
decisis by departing from Supreme Court and circuit law. Therefore,
Clarett held that the non-statutory exception applied to the Eligibility
Rules and reversed the lower court injunction order to permit Clarett to
enter the draft.73
IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Antitrust Labor Exemptions
In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Act to generally promote free
competition and prohibit any restraints on trade and commerce.74 In 1914,
Congress passed the Clayton Act as a statutory exception, protecting cer69. Id. at 138-39 (noting that the collective bargaining process may lead to some disfavored employees, but seeks the best deal for the players overall).
70. Id. at 139-40 (explaining that entrance of competing employees would affect wages and work
standards for new and old employees).
71. Id. at 139-41, 143 (holding that the terms were terms of the NFL CBA and therefore shielded
from antitrust scrutiny and declining to address whether the Eligibility Rules were as a matter of law
incorporated by reference into the CBA through the Constitution and Bylaws).
72. Id. at 142.
73. Id. at 143.
74. The Sherman Act states in part that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); see Northern Pac. Ry. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)
(“The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”).
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tain labor activities from antitrust violations.75 To further shield organized
labor activities from antitrust violation, Congress passed the NorrisLaGuardia Act of 1932.76 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Wagner
Act, or National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA”), which embodies
the core of U.S. labor relations policy.77 Within these four statutes, Congress established a general prohibition on anti-competitive acts that would
restrain trade and commerce and then clarified a national policy promoting
and protecting unionized labor.78 The fundamental conflict between the
antitrust prohibition on anticompetitive collusion and labor policies promoting unionization and collective bargaining has led to nearly a century
of litigation.79 This long running friction has recently found professional
sports as the focal arena of contention between labor and employers.80
In addition to the statutory exemption expressed in the Clayton Act,
the Supreme Court has interpreted 15 U.S.C. to allow for certain nonstatutory exemptions from antitrust violations.81 The antitrust labor exemptions (statutory and non-statutory) have led to much confusion and
litigation.82 National labor policy clearly promotes the benefits of equal
powered bargaining during contractual negotiations to allow employers
and employees to reach a mutually beneficial contract.83 The goal of collective bargaining is to allow for parity during negotiations, and this collusion of actors, among employers (horizontal consumers competing for labor) and among employees (horizontal suppliers competing to provide
75. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130 (giving examples of statutory exception to include boycotts and
picketing).
76. U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941) (holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act immunized
certain labor activities from antitrust action, protecting strikes, picketing, and other forms of employee
self help).
77. John J. Baroni, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.: Labor’s Antitrust Touchdown Called Back; United
States Supreme Court Reinforces Nonstatutory Labor Exemption from Antitrust Laws 33 Tulsa L.J.
401, 403 (1997).
78. Id. at 403-04; Shawn Treadwell, An Examination of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption from the
Antitrust Laws, in the Context of Professional Sports, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 955, 960 (1996).
79. Jonathan P. Heyl, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.: Pulling a Tarp of Antitrust Immunity over the
Entire Playing Field and Leaving the Game 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1030, 1030 (1997); See National Labor
Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (stating purpose of Act). Section 7 of the Act guarantees that
"[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . ." 29 U.S.C. §
157 (1982).
80. Weiler & Roberts, supra n. 36, at 222.
81. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622
(1975) (stating that "[t]he nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy favoring the
association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions").
82. Wood, 809 F.2d at 959 (stating in part “[t]he interaction of the [antitrust laws] and federal labor
legislation is an area of law marked more by controversy than by clarity”).
83. Baroni, supra n. 77, at 403 (discussing Congress’ creation of a system of countervailing powers
through collective bargaining).
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labor) runs a direct course into antitrust violation.84 Litigation in the area
defined by the collision of these two federal policies has raised many unanswered questions regarding the scope and the effectiveness of the nonstatutory labor exemption.85
Where the alleged antitrust violation does not fall under a labor exemption (where courts have found that neither the statutory nor the nonstatutory labor exception wards the alleged restraint from antitrust violation), courts have proceeded to determine if the violation is per se illegal.86
The Silver Exception precludes a per se antitrust violation where the facts
show support for the restraint.87 In situations where the Silver Exception
applied, the analysis would proceed to determine if the alleged restraint
was permitted under the Rule of Reason (the restraint being unreasonable
based either on (1) the nature or character of the restraint, or (2) on surrounding circumstances leading to a presumption of intended restraint of
trade or enhanced prices).88 The Supreme Court has held that this reasonableness test should only include consideration of economic factors and not
policy considerations that may have been considered in the per se analysis.89
B. Historic Supreme Court Law Regarding Non-Statutory Exemption
Over the past half century, the Supreme Court has heard a handful of
cases addressing the interplay between national labor policy (under the
Clayton Act, Norris-LaGuardia Act and NLRA) and federal antitrust law
(under the Sherman Act). The following Supreme Court cases leading up
to Brown set forth that to claim the non-statutory exemption, parties exclusive to a bargaining relationship must bargain in good faith when negotiat-

84. Id. at 403-04.
85. See infra pts. III(C), IV(C) and V (regarding differing rationale from Second and Eighth Circuits).
86. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364-67 (1963); see U.S. Trotting Assn. v. Chicago
Downs Assn., 665 F.2d 781, 789-90 (7th Cir. 1981) (recognizing acceptance of Silver based exception
to antitrust cases particularly in organized sports).
87. See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1064-65; see also Itri, supra n. 13, at 307-08 (interpreting
the Silver Exception to avoid per se illegality if (1) the industry requires self-regulation; “(2) the collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end consistent with a policy justifying self-regulation, (b) is
reasonably related to that goal, and (c) is no more extensive than necessary; and (3) the association
provides procedural safeguards which ensure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnish a basis
for judicial review”).
88. Prof. Engrs., 435 U.S. at 690, 694-95 (finding the Society’s restraint on competition unreasonable because the restraint on competitive bidding, although not price fixing on its face, prevented all
customers from making price comparisons).
89. See id. at 692 (noting that the Rule of Reason analysis only requires accounting for economic
considerations).

File: Sia (macro)

168

Created on: 12/20/2005 12:25:00 AM

PIERCE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:32:00 AM

Vol. 4, No. 1

ing hours, wages, and working conditions (mandatory subjects of collective bargaining).90
1. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, Intl. Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers
The Supreme Court first addressed the non-statutory labor exception in
1945 when it decided a case brought by a non-local employer of electrical
workers against the union for allegedly colluding with local employers to
“monopolize all the business in New York City.”91 The Court, recognizing
that the union sought the agreements with local employers in order to obtain desirable wages and conditions, held that the non-statutory labor exception did not apply in cases such as this, where the union colluded with
“employers and manufacturers of goods to restrain competition, in, and to
monopolize the marketing of, such goods.”92
2. United Mine Workers v. Pennington
Twenty years later, in 1965, the Supreme Court heard United Mine
Workers v. Pennington93 and declined to find an exception to the Sherman
Act based on actions by a union to promote the monopoly power of certain
employers. A small coal mine operator alleged that the coal mining industry had been trapped by a collective bargaining agreement, where employers colluded with the mine workers union to set wages at a level where
certain operators would be financially unable to compete and thereby
forced out of business.94 The Court recognized that § 20 of the Clayton
Act and § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act specifically removed the existence of labor unions from the grasps of antitrust laws.95 Still, the Court
iterated a limitation to the extent of the exception, stating “a union forfeits
its exemption from antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has
agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other
bargaining units.”96 Pennington went on to set forth that the labor excep-

90. Treadwell, supra n. 78, at 961.
91. Allen Bradley Co. v. Loc. No. 3, Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 798-800, 809 (1945).
92. Id. at 798, 810 (emphasis added). Notably, the Court recognized the restraint to be a direct
impact on the goods, therefore being an impact on the business of the marketing and supply of these
goods to the public.
93. 381 U.S. 657, 661 (1965).
94. Id. at 659-61.
95. Id. at 661-62.
96. Id. at 665.
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tion existed as a means to allow the Sherman Act and the NLRA to harmonize and co-exist.97
3. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea98 decided the same day as
Pennington, involved a claim by a meat seller that a butchers union in Chicago had agreed with a meat sellers trade association to limit the hours of
operation in order to stifle competition with certain sellers. The Supreme
Court noted that the “hours restriction” was to control the hours in the
workday and also to restrict nighttime competition by non-unionized laborers. One of the sellers, Jewel Tea Company, signed the agreement under threat of an employee strike and subsequently brought suit against the
union and the association under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Jewel Tea was the first time the Supreme Court identified and recognized a non-statutory labor exception to antitrust law.99 A plurality held
that the “hours restriction” was protected by the non-statutory exemption,
but for differing reasons.100 Justice White, writing for himself and two
other justices, balanced the interests of the unionized workers against any
anti-competitive impact on the market.101 White found no antitrust violation, because the marketing-hours restriction was “so intimately related to
wages, hours, and working conditions that the . . . bona fide, arm’s-length
bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies . . . [is] exempt from
the Sherman Act.”102 Goldberg, concurring in the judgment but under different reasoning, agreed in the application of the exemption but stated that
no balancing was needed because all collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA is outside the
grasp of antitrust laws.103 Justice Douglas and the two other remaining
97. Id.; Baroni, supra n. 77, at 414.
98. 381 U.S. 676, 680-81 (1965) (setting forth a notably split decision showing the disagreement
amongst the court as to the boundaries of the non-statutory exemption).
99. See id. at 689-90 (recognizing that marketing-hours restrictions are so “intimately related to
wages, hours and working conditions” that they are similarly exempt from the Sherman Act even
though not statutorily exempt).
100. Id. at 698 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
101. Id. at 689, 691.
102. Id. at 689-90 (also stating that “national labor policy expressed in the National Labor Relations
Act places beyond the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how
long, employees must work. An agreement on these subjects between the union and the employers in a
bargaining unit is not illegal under the Sherman Act, nor is the union's unilateral demand for the same
contract of other employers in the industry”).
103. Id. at 711-12 (stating that the NLRA “declares it to be the policy of the United States to promote
the establishment of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment by free collective
bargaining between employers and unions. . . This national scheme would be virtually destroyed by the
imposition of Sherman Act criminal and civil penalties upon employers and unions engaged in such
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justices dissented on the grounds that the agreement was subject to antitrust laws and not exempted.104
4. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumber & Steamfitters Loc. No. 100
A decade after Jewel Tea, the Supreme Court again addressed the nonstatutory exemption in Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumber &
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100.105 This case involved a labor union’s
requirement that contractors hire subcontractors which employed union
members. Connell, a contractor, sued the union arguing that the union’s
efforts to compel contractors to only hire work from certain subcontractors
violated antitrust law. 106 The six-justice majority refused to apply the antitrust non-statutory labor exception, and remanded, holding that the agreement was not protected by any labor exemptions.107 Connell held that the
non-statutory exception applied only to agreements achieved through a
collective bargaining relationship.108 Notably, the court recognized that
certain union activities (although in the presence of collective bargaining)
would cause “significant adverse effects on the market and on consumers –
effects unrelated to the union’s legitimate goals” and could be outside of
the non-statutory labor exception shield.109
These four cases set the relevant case law precedent for the circuits to
interpret and apply the non-statutory labor exception. The limited extent of
case law has been a particularly troubling point of contention between the
circuits (particularly between the Second Circuit and Eighth Circuit’s interpretations of how employee-raised claims are to be handled in situations
governed by the collective bargaining process).110 A critical point of departure in the interpretation of the non-statutory labor exception has developed when determining whether the exception has a different standard
when applied to employer and employee raised claims, business and labor
market claims, respectively.111
collective bargaining. To tell the parties that they must bargain about a point but may be subject to
antitrust penalties if they reach an agreement is to stultify the congressional scheme”).
104. Id. at 697.
105. 421 U.S. at 619.
106. Id. at 618-19, 620-21.
107. Id. at 625.
108. Id. at 635.
109. Id. at 624 (emphasis added, meaning consumer market and not the labor market per se); see
Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, The Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions for Anticompetitive
Litigation, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 757, 785-86 (1992) (recognizing Connell found the union activity outside of
the labor exception because by properly distinguishing anticompetitive restraints on business markets
from restraints in labor markets, here the restraints on business were substantially anticompetitive to the
degree beyond any non-statutory labor exemption).
110. See infra pt. IV(C) (Eighth and Second Circuit interpretations) and accompanying text.
111. See id. (Brown discussion) and accompanying text.
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C. Regional Application of Non-Statutory Labor Exception
1. The Eighth Circuit Interpretation
In 1976, the Eighth Circuit decided Mackey, where a group of NFL
players brought an antitrust action against the NFL Rozelle Rule, which
allows the league commissioner to require any club acquiring a free agent
to compensate the player’s former club.112 The Eighth Circuit relied heavily on Supreme Court precedent,113 in averring that a non-statutory exception would apply if the three following inquiries were answered in the affirmative: (1) whether the parties involved were parties to collective bargaining agreements; (2) whether the agreements were pertaining to mandatory subjects of bargaining; and (3) whether the agreement was product of
bona fide arm’s-length negotiations.114
Mackey answered the first two prongs in the affirmative, but held that
the Rozelle Rule was not the product of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations.115 Mackey found sufficient evidence to support a holding that the
restraint was not the product of bona-fide arm’s-length negotiations because it was unilaterally imposed by the NFL without a quid pro quo, or
mutual consideration.116 Proceeding to a merit based analysis under antitrust principles, the court found that despite there being an issue between
players against their employer, it was still a business or product market
restraint and subject to antitrust analysis.117 First, the court addressed the
rule under a per se violation analysis and found that restraint would be
better analyzed under the Rule of Reason.118 Ultimately, Mackey found
that the Rozelle Rule violated the Rule of Reason because it was an unreasonable restraint on labor conditions.119 Having found the restraint unrea-

112. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609.
113. Id. at 613-15 (relying heavily on Connell, Jewel Tea, and Pennington for interpretation of governing principles behind the non-statutory labor exception to require a three question analysis).
114. Id. at 614-15; see Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on the Labor Market: the Failure
of Stare Decisis, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 337, 392-94 (1996) (arguing that the court’s requirement of bonafide arm’s-length negotiations to lack any principled justification because it would undermine the
NLRA mandate against government interference in private labor issues).
115. 543 F.2d at 615-16.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 616-22 (rejecting the NFL’s argument that the restraint on players’ services was a restraint
on labor and not a product market, the latter being prohibited by antitrust law and the former being
exempted by the Clayton Act).
118. Id. at 619-20 (finding (1) traditional per se violations were for claims between business competitors, not between union and employers, and (2) that the goal of minimizing the need for intensive
inquiries into the market, was not applicable because of the lower court’s exhaustive analysis).
119. Id. at 620-21 (finding substantial evidence that player mobility and salaries were unreasonably
restrained because the rule was more restrictive than necessary to protect any interests of the NFL).
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sonably anticompetitive, the court held that the Rozelle Rule was an antitrust violation.120
About a decade after Mackey, the Eighth Circuit decided Powell v. National Football League.121 Powell involved an antitrust claim that the postimpasse NFL imposition of the college draft and uniform players’ contract
terms constituted unlawful restraints of competition.122 Powell ultimately
held that the present case was subject to the non-statutory labor exception
because the alleged restraint was a product of an ongoing collective bargaining process and therefore shielded by the non-statutory labor exception.123 Powell has been interpreted to set forth a rule (which was notably
not followed by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Pro Football)124 that antitrust law did not apply to any situations which involved labor law (where a
union represented employees in a collective bargaining process).125
2. The Second Circuit Law
In contrast to Mackey, the Second Circuit has declined to follow a specific three-part test to determine the extent of the non-statutory exemption.126 In 1984, 12 years before Brown, the Second Circuit decided Wood
v. National Basketball Association127; Wood held that the NBA’s rules regarding College Draft, Right of First Refusal, and Revenue Sharing/Salary
Cap System were part of the NBA CBA and were mandatory subjects of
bargaining. Wood was drafted into the NBA and later challenged the draft
process and salary caps as limiting competition for college players.128 The
court appreciated that rules prohibiting Wood from becoming a free agent
were to his detriment, but went on to explain the union was under no obligation to please everyone; rather, the union had properly sought the best

120. Id. at 622-23.
121. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989) (the author notes that this case was not followed by the Supreme
Court in Brown, but is being discussed as a useful reference to understand Eighth Circuit application of
the non-statutory labor exception).
122. Id. at 1295.
123. Id. at 1304. Powell stated that “as long as there is a possibility that proceedings may be commenced before the Board, or until final resolution of Board proceedings and appeals there from, the
labor relationship continues and the labor exemption applies.” Id. at 1303-04.
124. See infra pts. IV(2)-(3) and accompanying text (Brown declined to follow the Eighth Circuit’s
blanket application of the non-statutory labor exception to all situations that were found to be part of
the collective bargaining process.).
125. Student Author, Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory
Labor Exception, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 874-75 (1991).
126. See infra pt. IV(C)(2) (finding support to not follow Mackey from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
lack of mention of the Mackey Factors when deciding Brown).
127. 809 F.2d at 954.
128. Id. at 958.

File: Sia (macro)

2005

Created on: 12/20/2005 12:25:00 AM

CLARETT V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:32:00 AM

173

overall deal for the players through the collective bargaining process.129
The court noted that where union representatives negotiate and deal on
behalf of labor suppliers, the good of the many would unavoidably lead to
some laborers having undesirable treatment.130 Here, Wood’s ability to
become a free agent at his own initiative was not a right that the union had
secured during the collective bargaining process.131 The court therefore
held that the terms were negotiated in good faith during the collective bargaining process and therefore were shielded from federal antitrust law.132
Wood interpreted then current Supreme Court precedent to mandate
that in collective bargaining situations, employee representatives have the
power to negotiate terms that could likely be undesirable to many employees (including employees not in the bargaining unit).133 Further, the court
importantly noted that the Supreme Court prohibited courts from measuring the value of terms and tactics used during collective bargaining negotiations.134 “We need not determine the precise limits of the rules laid
down by the cases cited or consider fine distinctions going to whether
product- or labor-market activities are in issue. Wood's claim . . . implicates the labor market and subverts federal labor policy.”135 Wood declined to precisely lay out the differences between labor and product market impacts, but left the door open for further explanation.
Two years before Brown, the Second Circuit decided National Basketball Association v. Williams.136 In Williams, the NBA sought a court declaration that the continued imposition of certain disputed provisions of the
then expired CBA were not in violation of antitrust laws, and that disputed
provisions were lawful even if antitrust laws applied. The players’ union
counterclaimed, asserting that continued imposition of the terms from the
expired CBA were antitrust violation.137 The Second Circuit held that the
non-statutory labor exemption shielded the imposition of terms agreed
upon from a CBA even after its expiration and into impasse.138
Later that same year, Caldwell v. American Basketball Association139
ruled that a CBA between a league and players’ union barred a player from
129. Id. at 960.
130. Id. at 961.
131. See id. at 962 (noting that no special judicial exception should allow courts to intervene to strike
down collective bargaining terms, otherwise the entire process would unravel).
132. Id. at 962-63.
133. Id. at 960.
134. Id at 962 n.5 (stating that courts are not to attempt to measure a quid pro quo in determining if a
negotiation resulted in even terms).
135. Id. at 963.
136. 45 F.3d 684, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1995).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 693.
139. 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
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bringing an otherwise plausible antitrust claim against the league. A professional basketball player brought antitrust and tort action against the
American Basketball Association (“ABA”) and others, alleging that he was
blacklisted and prevented from playing professional basketball as a result
of his activities as president of the players’ union.140 The Second Circuit
held that the non-statutory labor exemption barred an antitrust claim, in
that allowing player’s claims to proceed under the Sherman Act would
subvert fundamental principles of federal labor policy.141 The court then
noted that labor policy required the NLRB to handle disputes such as
whether discharge is the result of union activities or for cause.142
Pre-Brown Second Circuit case law interpreted the non-statutory labor
exception in labor markets to be highly deferential to national labor law
and considered that the NLRB had jurisdiction, and not the antitrust
courts.143 In cases where the alleged violation was raised between a supplier of labor and a consumer of labor, the court interpreted that congress
specifically desired to shield the results of the collective bargaining process
from antitrust review. These Second Circuit cases were further strengthened by the Supreme Court in 1996 when it found that an antitrust claim by
development squad players was exempted by the non-statutory labor exception despite the NFL and NFLPA being in impasse.144
3. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
In 1996, in the midst of this split in the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to again address the “intersection of the Nation’s labor
and antitrust laws.”145 Justice Breyer’s opinion set out to clarify the conflict
between otherwise opposing policies and provided a guide by which the
non-statutory labor exception could be applied in all labor markets.146 In
Brown, the NFL and NFLPA had reached an impasse after negotiations to
renew the CBA had failed. A group of NFL players claimed that the collective bargaining process had expired and that NFL had violated antitrust
law by unilaterally setting policy for negotiations with development squad
players for wages, hours and so forth.147 The issue was whether the NFL
salary arrangement was protected from antitrust liability by federal labor
140. Id. at 526.
141. Id. at 527, 530.
142. Id. at 530 (noting that the NLRA had governed labor disputes for over 50 years in every labor
market except that of professional sports).
143. See supra pt. IV(C)(2) and accompanying text (discussing relevant Second Circuit case law).
144. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135.
145. Brown, 518 U.S. at 233.
146. See Baroni, supra n. 77, at 401.
147. Brown, 518 U.S. at 233-35.
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laws despite the NFL and NFLPA having reached an impasse.148 The
Court relied on case law precedent and interpretations of antitrust and labor
law and policy and thereby declined to follow the Eighth Circuit opinions
from nearly a decade earlier.149
Brown found that non-statutory exemption applied because to find otherwise would open the flood gates for litigation about much labor law, and
would allow courts to step into the shoes traditionally occupied by NLRB
with respect to collective bargaining agreements.150 Justice Breyer noted a
particular concern raised by the Court in Jewel Tea “about antitrust judges
‘roaming at large’ through the bargaining process.”151
Brown noted that all restraints, agreed upon by the parties to the collective bargaining negotiations, can be considered to be part of the CBA and
therefore subject to the non-statutory exception.152 By considering the
impasse still part of the collective bargaining process, Brown recognized
the scope of the non-statutory exemption to encompass issues external but
concerning a written collective bargaining agreement.153 Further, the Court
declined to make a special ruling specific to professional football players
(although noting that these players do possess some unique characteristics)
and instead defined the non-statutory labor exemption for all labor markets
that involve collective bargaining as a means of labor negotiations.154
Brown’s deference to the NLRB when deciding this employer-raised antitrust case was a highly controversial seminal case because it clarified the
Supreme Court’s position that the non-statutory labor exception strongly
favored the labor process to address claims raised in a labor market governed by the collective bargaining process.155

148. Id.
149. Id. at 231-50 (Brown declined to mention or follow the Mackey factors and the Powell interpretation, which favored blanket exemption in cases that involved collective bargaining.); see Weiler &
Roberts, supra n. 36 and accompanying text (discussing the differing approaches by the Eighth and
Second Circuits); supra pt. IV(C)(2) and accompanying text (Second Circuit cases which were decided
in the aftermath of Mackey still declined to follow the Mackey factors and instead provided its own
interpretations.).
150. Id. at 247-48, 250.
151. Id. at 248 (noting the opinion of Justice Goldberg in Jewel Tea, and stating that antitrust courts
are not well equipped to address motives used during tactical negotiations in the collective bargaining
process).
152. Id. at 243-44, 250 (stating that Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell only dealt with agreements
because of the specific fact patterns, but that the exception was broader).
153. Id. at 250 (stating that the conduct at issue took place during and immediately after a collective
bargaining negotiation, growing out of and directly relating to the bargaining process).
154. See id. at 249-50; Baroni, supra n. 77, at 401.
155. See e.g. Baroni, supra n. 77, at 402.
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V. RESTRAINTS ON LABOR MARKETS VS. RESTRAINTS ON BUSINESS
MARKETS
Brown clarified a subtle yet important and long standing principle that
antitrust laws have long treated labor impacts and business impacts differently. In light of the scant Supreme Court cases dealing with the intricacies of the antitrust law non-statutory labor exception, the Second Circuit
and other circuits have interpreted the few available Supreme Court cases
to inherently distinguish labor market related cases from business (product)
market cases which more directly impacted consumers.156
In Wood, the Second Circuit held that Wood’s arguments that the restraints were subject to antitrust law were without valid legal grounds.157
The court noted that:
Each of the decisions involved injuries to employers who asserted
that they were being excluded from competition in the product
market. Wood cites no case in which an employee or potential
employee was able to invalidate a collective agreement on antitrust
grounds because he or she might have been able to extract more
favorable terms through individual bargaining.158
The Second Circuit further stated that it need not specifically delineate
the different circumstances that would fall into either a product (business)
market or a labor market analysis under the non-statutory labor exception.159 Instead, the court explained that these two situations were governed by separate areas of law, antitrust law and labor law, respectfully; the
court further opened the door for a later case(s) to provide the proper detailed guidance to distinguish how to handle antitrust claims raised by employees or employers in collective bargaining defined situations.160 Wood
and commentators set the stage for a court to further delineate the application of the non-statutory labor exception in antitrust allegations raised by
suppliers of labor – Brown answered the call.161
156. See supra pt. IV(C)(2) (Second Circuit Law) and accompanying text.
157. 809 F.2d at 963.
158. Id. (emphasis in original).
159. Id.
160. See id.; see generally Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The
Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 Geo. L.J. 19, 20-21 (1986) (noting that in
situations where employees have elected to unionize and participate in the collective bargaining process, any resulting restraints – if purely impacting labor markets – would be shielded from antitrust
violation; implying that cases which fell between the extremes of pure labor market impacts and pure
business market impacts would require further guidance by courts).
161. By distinguishing the immediate claim by Wood, a player employee, from the employer raised
issues in Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell, Wood implicitly interpreted employee raised antitrust
claims which had primary impacts on labor markets as being highly deferential to NLRA and NLRB
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In 1980, the Third Circuit set forth that "[t]he term nonstatutory exemption . . . is a shorthand description of an interpretation of the Sherman
Act, making that statute inapplicable to restraints imposed in the interest of
lawful union monopoly power in the labor market."162 Consolidated Express v. New York Shipping Association163 interpreted the non-statutory
labor exception to require deferral to restraints created through collective
bargaining process if the impact was inflicted primarily in the labor market
and only peripherally in the business market.
Two years later, in 1982, the Seventh Circuit decided Mid-America
Regional Bargaining Association v. Will County Carpenters District
Council.164 In this case, suppliers of labor brought antitrust claims against
the union, contractors and the local utility claiming that the defendants had
conspired together to set wages outside of the collective bargaining process.165 The court held that the non-statutory labor exemption applies where
the alleged restraint “is not a 'direct restraint on the business market' but
rather a direct restraint on the labor market, with only tangential effects on
the business market.”166 The actions by the defendants were found to be
within the boundaries of both the non-statutory and statutory labor exceptions to antitrust law because of the indirect business market restraints.167
VI. CLARETT – AN ANALYSIS
Many sports fans and commentators were shocked and surprised when
the Second Circuit reversed the antitrust violation found by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.168 Although many of
jurisdiction and effectively removed from the grasps of antitrust courts. Legal scholars and commentators have addressed the periphery of this issue and affirmed the position that some degree of “lessening
of business competition would have to be tolerated in order to achieve labor policy goals.” Eleanor R.
Hoffman, Labor and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation, 50 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1983).
Further, only restraints that involved the marketing of goods and services would be subject to antitrust
law, and where the restraint did not deal with marketing to consumers (business and/or product markets), the Sherman Act would not apply. Id. at 48.
162. Consol. Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Assn., 602 F.2d 494, 513 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated on other
grounds, Intl. Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Consol. Express, Inc., 448 U.S. 902 (1980).
163. Id. (citing to Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04, 512 (1940) where Justice Stone
succinctly explained that where a union’s imposition of wage setting terms were focused on labor
market and not intended or shown to have a direct impact on the product market).
164. 675 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1982).
165. Id. at 883.
166. Id. at 893.
167. Id.
168. Compare e.g. DraftClarett.org, http://www.draftclarett.org/index.html (July 8, 2005) (arguing
that the NFL’s motives for keeping players out are unreasonable and cost potential players their livelihoods) with e.g. Rick Harrow, The NFL at Draft Time – Business is Great, http://web.archive.org/
web/20040607014405/http://www.sportsbusinessnews.com/index.asp?story_id=35349 (June 6, 2004)
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these commentators may have extensive knowledge of the game and business of football, Clarett properly recognizes that the non-statutory labor
exemption applies to the NFL Eligibility Rules. Ultimately, labor laws
governing the collective bargaining process prevailed over the cries of antitrust violation, and the Second Circuit properly applied the non-statutory
labor exception to the Eligibility Rules.169
The Second Circuit’s decision is a proper interpretation and application
of the guiding principles behind federal antitrust law and national labor
law, and its respective policies. Supreme Court decisions and earlier Second Circuit and other circuit case law set a precedent that courts must defer
to the NLRB in situations where the restraint primarily impacts the labor
market (such as where an employee claims that they are being restrained in
their ability to provide labor) which is defined by the collective bargaining
process.170 The decision was supported by strong rationale based heavily
on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown, and with relevant circuit law.171
In particular, Clarett declined to openly denounce the Eighth Circuit’s
Mackey factors, and instead reaffirmed its own earlier interpretations of the
non-statutory labor exception.172 Clarett reaffirmed the interpretation that
the exception shields restraints primarily directed to labor markets when
the restraints are generated through the collective bargaining process.173
Generally, where the restraint is primarily in a labor market (which is
focused on the production of human labor) and the result of a mandatory
subject of bargaining, the non-statutory labor exemption should apply;
conversely, where the impact of the restraint is primarily focused in a business market (which impacts competition and consumer prices) a court
should look to the Mackey factors as a plausible standard.174 Further, the
non-statutory labor exception to antitrust law should be understood not as a
deviation from antitrust law, but rather as coalescence between antitrust

(stating that the court was right to keep Clarett ineligible, not because of antitrust or labor policy but
merely because “pro football is a tougher mental and physical game than any other sport”).
169. See supra pt. III (discussing the outcome of the Clarett case).
170. Compare Wood, 809 F.2d at 962-63 (distinguishing cases brought by employers and those
brought by employees) with Pennington, 381 U.S. at 657 (where the claim was brought by an employer
against a union that had allegedly colluded with the other employers in the multi-employer bargaining
unit to impact the business).
171. See supra pt. III(C) and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s rationale.).
172. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134 n. 14.
173. Id.
174. See generally Brown, 518 U.S. at 240-41, 251 (explaining that the restraint, a mandatory subject
of bargaining in a setting dominated by collective bargaining, was highly protected by labor law and
that since the restraint concerned only the parties at issue – the labor relationship between employer
and employee – the post-impasse development squad wages were protected from antitrust review;
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134 n. 14 (citing to support from other jurisdictions in noting the labor market
restraint where employees raise antitrust claims).
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and labor laws.175 Under Brown, where the restraint is a mandatory subject
of bargaining, generated as the result of the collective bargaining process,
the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust law more heavily favors labor policy and requires courts to defer to labor law remedies under the
authority of the NLRB.176 Conversely, earlier Supreme Court analysis of
employer-raised antitrust claims alleging collusive behavior between the
union and competing employers have resulted in a more demanding standard – favoring antitrust law where restraints focus on business competition.177
In light of the post-Brown dual standard approach to the exemption,
Clarett tackles the question of whether an employee eligibility restraint,
generated through the collective bargaining process, can be shielded by the
non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust law. Antitrust law prohibits
unreasonably anticompetitive restraints in the business market178 and labor
law promotes the use of collective bargaining as a means to balance the
power between employees and employers.179 Clarett explains in footnote
fourteen that antitrust and labor law, although seeming to directly collide,
can be considered reconciled by the non-statutory labor exemption to dictate distinct legal standards where restraints either primarily impact the
business or the labor markets.180
Clarett aptly recognized binding precedent to show that the nonstatutory labor exception shields collective bargaining related restraints in
cases where the impact is focused primarily on labor markets,181 noting that
the non-statutory exemption applies “where needed to make the collective

175. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130, 135.
176. Id. at 134-35 (interpreting the rationale set forth by Brown regarding favoring resolution through
NRLB action and congressional labor policy of exempting courts from usurping the role of the NLRB).
177. See supra pt. IV(B) and accompanying text (discussing historical Supreme Court precedent
before Brown).
178. The Sherman Act was limited by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts to apply to unreasonable restraints in the commerce, with human labor and collective bargaining being considered outside
of the definition of commerce.
179. This note posits that the infamous intersection between antitrust law and labor law can be
viewed as a spectrum of coalescing laws where the non-statutory labor exemption can be viewed as
gray area between antitrust and labor. The non-statutory labor exception accordingly would lean towards labor policy and deference to NLRA and NLRB in cases which involved restraints more heavily
related to labor relations (i.e. labor related claims brought by employees against employers or union
representatives). Accordingly, the exception would require courts to do a more stringent analysis in
cases (in accordance with Jewel Tea and related employer raised cases) where the impact was predominantly focused on the products and business market, and where the collusive activity by the union with
employer(s) would result in direct anticompetitive impacts on consumers.
180. Id. at 134.
181. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134-35 (Accordingly, the court supports its interpretation of the law as set
forth by earlier cases such as Wood, by noting that Brown shared very similar rationale, when it was
decided over a decade after Mackey.).
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bargaining process work.”182 Further, Clarett’s holding is proper because
the Eligibility Rules dictate who is eligible to work, concern which
amounts to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.183 Commentators
have, however, voiced disapproval of the Second Circuit ruling.184 These
opinions fail to recognize the distinct focuses of antitrust law in the business market; labor law in the labor market; and the statutory and nonstatutory labor exception to antitrust law to provide a continuum in the
interplay between these two markets.185
This note asserts that Clarett properly distinguishes between restraints
primarily focused in labor markets from those primarily focused in business markets by viewing earlier Supreme Court precedent in light of the
more recent Brown decision.186 This analysis will attempt to shed some
light on how the non-statutory labor exemption has developed into a dual
standard system which is flexible to adjust to the seemingly conflicting
policies of antitrust law and national labor law.
A. Non-Statutory Labor Exemptions: Labor Market vs. Business Market
Commentators have noted that non-statutory labor exemptions to antitrust violations apply to restraints generated from collective bargaining,
where alleged anticompetitive impacts of a restraint are felt only in the
labor market.187 Clarett interprets Brown (which declined to endorse or
mention the Mackey factors) to support the pre-Brown governing Second
Circuit law, that restraints which primarily focus on labor markets are exempted from antitrust law if the restraints deal with mandatory subjects of

182. Brown, 518 U.S. at 234.
183. See supra pt. III(C) and accompanying text (discussing the Clarett court’s rationale).
184. See e.g. Scott A. Freeman, Student Author, An End Run Around Antitrust Law: The Second
Circuit’s Blanket Application of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in Clarett v. NFL, 45 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 155, 190-91 (2004) (providing an unconvincing proposition that the Clarett three judge panel
interpretation of the Brown Supreme Court eight judge majority opinion – setting forth that collective
bargaining produced restraints which primarily impact labor markets are subject to the non-statutory
labor exception – fails to provide clarity and therefore favors the Eight Circuit interpretations).
185. See generally Weiler & Roberts, supra n. 36, at 176-78 (averring that anticompetitive restraints
are usually considered to operate in the product market, whereas player restraints in professional sports
– and other employer/employee situations – typically involve labor related concerns and do not primarily impact consumer welfare).
186. Antitrust Law – Nonstatutory Labor Exemption – Second Circuit Exempts NFL Eligibility Rules
from Antitrust Scrutiny – Clarett v. National Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), 118 Harv.
L. Rev. 1379, 1379 (2005) (stating that “[t]his new standard wisely allows for more flexibility in nonstatutory exemption analysis, particularly because it avoids a paramount weakness of the Mackey
framework: namely, the Eighth Circuit's formulation making determinative the bona fide arm’s-length
negotiations requirement”) [hereinafter Harv. Antitrust].
187. See e.g. Roberts, supra n. 114, at 338-39.
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bargaining. 188 Here, Clarett’s antitrust claim that the Eligibility Rules
barred him from offering his services should be considered to be a restraint
focused primarily in a labor market because he is complaining of an injury
suffered as a supplier of labor.
Employee raised complaints regarding labor practices and employerraised complaints regarding anticompetitive business practices differ because the labor practices are governed primarily by labor law, whereas the
anticompetitive business practices are governed primarily by antitrust
law.189 Furthermore, restraints primarily focused in labor markets, (“labor
restraints”) have been considered to be exempt where the restraints have
actually created lower prices and monopoly power (where the anticompetitive power is held by the buyer and not the seller).190 As such, Clarett’s
claim should be considered to be a labor restraint and not a business market restraint because it involves a restraint where employers and employees
have agreed to limit the supply of labor.
Prior to Brown, courts applied the non-statutory labor exemption with
limited Supreme Court guidance.191 Mackey addressed an employee raised
claim under a similar analysis as provided in Jewel Tea, Pennington, and
Connell, all of which addressed employer-raised claims. Other jurisdictions, including the Second Circuit, however, distinguished employee
raised claims from employer-raised claims.192 This recognition is ultimately an appreciation for the difference between labor markets (which
have been deemed by Congress to be primarily governed by National Labor Law and policy) and business markets (which are primarily governed,
inter alia, by antitrust law).193
There is a tempting but misled tendency to treat both the labor and
product markets in a similar fashion; after all, both markets ultimately impact the end consumers (indirectly and directly, respectively). Further,
both markets involve consumers and suppliers. Reading the Sherman Act
188. See supra pt. V and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s interpretation that there
is a distinction in labor market related restraints, as supported by Brown).
189. Roberts, supra, n. 114, at 338-40 (discussing the impact of the non-statutory labor exception to
labor markets and how there has been some case law support even outside of professional sports).
190. See Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass. Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 930-31 (1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer, J.) (noting that the lower prices resulting from the health service consumer should not be scrutinized by the
antitrust court). Here, the buyer of labor is the NFL and the supplier of labor is Clarett.
191. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 131; John Gerba, Student Author, Instant Reply: A Review of the Case of
Maurice Clarett, the Application of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, and its Protection of the NFL
Draft Eligibility Rules, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2383, 2414-15 (2005).
192. See supra pt. V and accompanying text (where claims raised by employees in the context of
suppliers of labor are typically directed towards restraints which are primarily focused on labor markets, and where claims raised by employers are typically raised as claims regarding competition and
business markets).
193. See supra pt. IV(A) and accompanying text.
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in isolation, all anticompetitive activities would be subject to violation.194
Looking at labor policy, however, it is clear that in labor markets, Congress clearly wanted to promote collective bargaining to be beyond the
reach of antitrust courts.195
The inevitable collision of these two national policies resulted in the
statutory and non-statutory exceptions. To reconcile these policies, one
must read the laws together and understand that the antitrust and labor laws
and policies create a continuum where antitrust and labor work together
through the non-statutory labor exemption.196 Although the Supreme Court
has been reserved in the amount of guidance to provide, Brown shows that
the non-statutory exceptions clearly distinguish between business market
anticompetitive activity and labor market anticompetitive activity.197 Notably, Clarett reads Brown and additional Second Circuit precedent to dictate that the courts should defer to NLRB jurisdiction where the alleged
restraint impacts the labor market and is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.198
Where an allegation of antitrust violation is particularly focused on labor concerns, the statutory labor exemptions (as defined inter alia by the
Clayton Act) and non-statutory labor exemptions (as defined by Supreme
Court precedent) dictate that jurisdiction belongs to the NLRB and not the
antitrust courts.199 In employee raised situations, the employee is arguing
that the impact is upon them as a labor supplier. The consuming public
may ultimately be impacted, but Congress has expressly (through national
labor policy) stated its desire to remove these types of claims from antitrust
charged courts and place it into the jurisdiction of labor law and the
NLRB.200 As a result, Clarett recognized that Maurice Clarett’s claims
involved a restraint which was brought to the court in the context of a labor

194. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (setting forth the policy goals of Sherman Act as prohibiting unreasonable
anticompetitive restraints and failing to distinguish between anticompetitive behavior by consumers or
suppliers).
195. Daniel H. Weintraub, 1994-1995 Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law: Labor Law:
Collective Bargaining, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 303, 305-07 (1996). Further, the policy of labor law is to allow
for workers and employers to be on equal bargaining strength to allow for the best possible labor terms.
196. See supra n. 178.
197. See Weiler & Roberts, supra n. 36, at 223-24 (noting that the Supreme Court has not issued a
blanket antitrust exemption, but has looked into the affected markets impacted by the alleged anticompetitive impacts to determine if the exemption should apply); Weintraub, supra n. 195, at 305-07 (noting Congress’ purpose in enacting the NLRA was to allow certain collective bargaining restraints to
persist and even those that may impact business markets).
198. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143; see infra pt. (VI)(D) and accompanying text (discussing why Clarett
was right in finding that the Eligibility Rules are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining).
199. Id.
200. Id.

File: Sia (macro)

2005

Created on: 12/20/2005 12:25:00 AM

CLARETT V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:32:00 AM

183

market restraint, and properly ruled that the Eligibility Rules were exempted because of the non-statutory labor exception.201
Having determined which type of market the antitrust claim resides,
the next step is to perform a detailed analysis of whether the non-statutory
labor exemption applies. Again, this note asserts that under Brown, a continuum exists between the Second and Eighth Circuit interpretations of the
non-statutory labor exemption.202 For restraints primarily focused in labor
markets, this note asserts that Clarett properly interprets Brown to recognize a stronger deference to labor law.203 For restraints primarily focused
in business markets, this note asserts that the underlying analysis set forth
by Mackey, interpreting pre-Brown Supreme Court law, properly sets a
standard that the exemption should apply for claims raised by parties to the
restraint, where the restraint is a mandatory subject of bargaining, and the
result of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations.204
B. Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in the Labor Market
Understanding that labor market restraints impact the relationship between labor and employers, the presence of a collective bargaining dictates
that the alleged antitrust claim should be quashed for an adjudication by
the NLRB under an unfair labor practice claim. Clarett insightfully recognizes that the non-statutory labor exemption waives antitrust liability for
any “restraints on competition imposed through the collective bargaining
process, so long as such restraints operate primarily in a labor market characterized by collective bargaining.”205 Brown set forth that the nonstatutory labor exemption applies to all mandatory subjects of bargaining
(even a post-impasse salary restraint) where a CBA is present. Here the
question turns on whether player eligibility is a mandatory subject of bargaining.206 Clarett correctly finds that the Eligibility Rules were mandatory
201. Wood and progeny accurately foresaw the direction that the Supreme Court would take and did
take in Brown.
202. Compare e.g. Jocelyn Sum, Clarett v. National Football League, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 807,
808, 822-24 (2005) (averring that the Second Circuit law should be trumped for Eighth Circuit law)
with e.g. supra pt. III(C) and accompanying text (discussing how Clarett declined to follow or reject
the Mackey factors, and instead set out its own interpretation because the factual situations between
Clarett and Mackey differed).
203. See supra pt. V and accompanying text; see generally Clarett, 369 F.3d 134 (declining to reject
Mackey, and instead noting that the Second Circuit and other Circuits have interpreted Brown and other
Supreme Court precedent to recognize a stronger deference to labor law for restraints primarily focused
in labor markets).
204. See supra pt. V and accompanying text; see generally Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613-16 (discussing
Supreme Court precedent relied upon in determining the three pronged Mackey factors).
205. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (citing to Brown, 518 U.S. at 235).
206. See infra pt. VI(D) and accompanying text (discussing whether the Eligibility Rules are Mandatory Subject of Bargaining or Incorporated by Reference).
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subjects of bargaining because of the immediate impact that draft eligibility has on the working conditions of current and future employees.207
Commentators have questioned whether professional athletes deserve a
different standard to determine whether player eligibility rules qualify as
mandatory subjects of bargaining (noting that in traditional collective bargaining wages are set by group and not made specific to certain employees). All labor markets defined by collective bargaining are within the
safeguard of the non-statutory exemption.208 To allow otherwise would
jeopardize the balance between labor and antitrust law and would “subvert
fundamental principles of our federal labor policy.”209 Clarett further explained that the rights of individual players to negotiate specific salaries in
no way demonstrated a departure from collective bargaining, and instead
was an example of agreements made through that very process.210 Therefore, Clarett was correct in finding that the Eligibility Rules were a part of
the CBA because restraint directly influenced terms of initial employment,
wages and working conditions, which are all mandatory subjects of bargaining agreed to in the presence of the CBA.
Where a CBA governs the relationship between employers and employees, increased deference is accorded to national labor policy for antitrust claims raised in labor markets (those raised by employees against
their employers or their unions). Accordingly, lessened deference is accorded to national labor policy where the claims involve anticompetitive
restraints which are raised in business markets (by competing employers
against either the multi-employer bargaining unit or an alleged colluding
union). This lessened deference can be generally characterized by the
relevant principles behind the Mackey factors; where the non-statutory
labor exemption applies if the agreement involves mandatory subjects of
negotiations, and where the agreement was reached through bona fide
arm’s-length negotiations.211
207. See supra n. 70 and accompanying text; supra pt. III(C) and accompanying text (disussing the
Second Circuit analysis of the Clarett case and finding that draft eligibility impact terms of initial
employment, wages and working conditions).
208. Brown, 518 U.S. at 249. “Petitioners also say that irrespective of how the labor exemption
applies elsewhere to multiemployer collective bargaining, professional sports is ‘special.’ We can
understand how professional sports may be special in terms of, say, interest, excitement, or concern.
But we do not understand how they are special in respect to labor law's antitrust exemption.” Id. at 248.
209. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (citing to Wood, 809 F.2d at 959). Notably, Brown, Clarett, and Wood
do overrule or conflict with Supreme Court precedent set forth from Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell. Instead, Clarett and company provide further insight as to how the non-statutory labor exception
is to be applied in cases raised by suppliers of labor whose antitrust allegations are restraints that primarily operate in the labor market and not the business market.
210. Id. at 139 (discussing rationale from Caldwell as being permitted as a right derived from collective bargaining).
211. See supra pt. V(B)(1) and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit law from Mackey and
Powell).
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C. Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in the Business Market
Jewel Tea, Pennington, and Connell, all address multi-employer collective bargaining situations where employers raised claims that union
activity with other employers was anticompetitive.212 Employer-raised
claims fall under business market analysis because the claim is that the
CBA causes an injury to the employer’s business, which is to supply either
goods or services to the consuming public. There is a subtle reason for
recognizing employer claims against fellow employers and/or unions. In
these situations employers compete with the other members of the multiemployer bargaining unit and antitrust claims raised by these employers
are typically related to marketing, competition in terms of product sales,
and other business related concerns.213 These business market restraints
restrict competition, directly impacting consumer prices.
The business market restraint analysis applies the exemption only
where the restraint impacts a party to the CBA and is the product of collective bargaining (being a mandatory subject of bargaining, agreed upon
through bona fide arm’s-length negotiations).214 The Eighth Circuit, in
Mackey, has properly interpreted these principles to interpret a three
pronged test which can be applied to business market restraints.
Under a Mackey type analysis, the first step is to determine whether
Clarett is a party to the CBA; the answer is in the affirmative. Clarett as a
potential player, is a party to the CBA because he was attempting to offer
his services under an employer-employee arrangement defined by the
CBA.215 The real issue for Clarett’s claim (assuming an analysis based on
business market) is whether the Eligibility Rules are a part of the CBA.216
This can be resolved by determining whether the Eligibility Rules are
mandatory subjects of bargaining217 or if they were the product of bona
fide arm’s-length negotiations (being properly incorporated by reference
into the CBA).218
212. See supra pt. IV(B) and accompanying text.
213. These concerns are arguably primarily related to restraints in the business market and not specifically related to restraints on the labor market (which typically include wage determination, employee eligibility and so forth).
214. See supra pt. IV(B) and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court precedent).
215. Itri, supra n. 13, at 331-32.
216. Effectively the purpose of the second and third prongs of the Mackey factors.
217. See supra pt. II(A) and accompanying text (discussing Haywood where the league declined to
bring an argument that the non-statutory labor exemption applied due to collective bargaining). Notably, in either labor market or business market, the dispositive issue is whether the Eligibility Rules
were truly mandatory subjects of bargaining. If yes, then the Eligibility Rules are a part of the CBA
and shielded from antitrust analysis; if no, the Eligibility Rules would not be subject to non-statutory
labor exception.
218. Worth mentioning is the fact that Brown specifically declined to mention the three pronged test
laid out in Mackey. The Supreme Court rather than endorse the Mackey factors, gave deference to
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D. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining or Incorporated by Reference?
The requirements of a mandatory subject of bargaining and whether
the restraint was the product of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations (by
being incorporated by reference in the Clarett fact pattern) both address the
same concept of whether the restraint is expressly or implicitly agreed to
by the parties to the collective bargaining process. Clarett properly answers both of these concepts in the affirmative by noting that the Eligibility
Rules were of such importance to the relationship between the union and
the league that they were effectively incorporated into the CBA. Mandatory subjects of bargaining are the conditions of employment which are
mandatory and therefore key to the collective bargaining process. Likewise, for a restraint to be the product of bona fide arms-length negotiations,
the restraint must be agreed upon by the parties during the CBA process.
Where a restraint is incorporated into the CBA by reference, it will be considered a product of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations.
Under both the labor market restraint analysis and the business market
restraint analysis, the question to determine whether a restraint is a mandatory subject of bargaining is the same, whether the restraint involves the
terms of initial employment, wages and working conditions, or immediately impacts these factors. Where the restraint is a mandatory subject of
bargaining and a CBA exists, Brown mandates that the CBA and nonstatutory labor exemption protect these mandatory subjects of bargaining
from antitrust analysis.219 The arguments that the NFL Eligibility Rules
are not mandatory either because the rules do not specifically fall into the
“wages, hours, or terms of employment” language, or were not the product
of express negotiations fails to convince. Learned commentators have
argued that the NFL Eligibility Rules are mandatory, “I have not talked to
anybody who is a labor lawyer – who would agree that entry requirements
are not a mandatory subject of bargaining.”220 Further, Clarett’s conclusion that the NFL Eligibility Rules are a mandatory subject of bargaining
due to the immediate impact they have on terms of employment is a better
national labor law because the claim raised by Brown was a labor market restraint. The Mackey factors, however, are still relevant law and have been followed in several jurisdictions. This note endorses
the principles set out by the Eighth Circuit but rather than following the specific three part test, prefers
a more flexible analysis which looks to determine if the restraint was either a mandatory subject of
bargaining, or a part of the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement.
219. See 518 U.S. at 250 (discussing why development squad salary restraints, albeit unilaterally
imposed post impasse, are still terms which the parties to a collective bargaining process are required to
negotiate even though they exist immediately after expiration of the CBA).
220. Jay Moyer, et al., Panel II: Maurice Clarett’s Challenge, 15 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media &
Ent. L.J. 391, 402 (2005) (statement made by Professor Gary Roberts in answering whether he believed
the Eligibility Rules were mandatory subjects of bargaining).
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understanding of the principles behind national labor policy.221 As such,
viewing the Eligibility Rules in either the labor or business market analyses, they would likely stand.222
Further, Clarett’s holding that the Eligibility Rules were mandatory
subjects of bargaining were properly supported by its reading of Brown,
which set forth a governing principle that in the presence of a collective
bargaining situation, all mandatory subjects of bargaining (such as salary
caps unilaterally imposed post impasse) were exempted from antitrust
claims raised in predominant labor market settings. By finding that the
Eligibility Rules directly impacted employment conditions of potential
players and current players (for example impacting veteran employment
and overall player salaries from increased labor competition), Clarett
deemed this restraint to be of equivalent importance as commonly recognized mandatory subjects such as player salary.
In determining whether the Eligibility Rules should be considered the
product of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations, if this restraint can be considered to have been incorporated by reference into the CBA, then the fact
that the NFLPA and the NFLMC both agreed to terms and conditions of
the CBA mandate that they are the product of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations. A court would be correct in determining that the Eligibility Rules
were incorporated into the CBA because the NFL CBA expressly incorporated the NFL Constitution and By-laws. Moreover, the current CBA was
signed and renewed in a labor market where these rules pervaded.223 Like
Brown, where the impasse was considered to be within the collective bargaining process even though the CBA had expired,224 the court is required
to see the collective bargaining process as a multifaceted practice that includes negotiating strategies, terms and tactics. These tactics are often
221. Wherein national labor law promotes the collective bargaining process and attempts to provide
labor with a more equal footing in negotiation power as compared to employers.
222. Having established that Clarett’s claim is within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, the next question
is what would happen if the NLRB found that there was an unfair labor practice. The NLRB could
likely find (had Clarett continued to pursue his clause according to the decision as set forth by the
Second Circuit) that the Eligibility Rules, as incorporated in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, were
not properly bargained for and are outside of the collective bargaining process and agreement. A
finding by the NLRB that the Eligibility Rules are not part of the CBA could result in Clarett continuing to bring his claim in the “antitrust” courts with the non-statutory labor exemption not applying.
223. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139-43. Notably, commentators have posited that the unanimous opinion by
the Second Circuit in Clarett incorrectly interpreted the NFL Eligibility Rules as mandatory subjects of
bargaining. See e.g. Gerba, supra n. 191, at 2414-17. These commentators fail to appreciate the meaning of the concept of “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” as described in the
NLRB as described in First Natl. Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981). Clarett properly
finds that the NFL Eligibility Rules are mandatory subjects of bargaining because it "[has] tangible
effects on the wages and working conditions of current NFL players." Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140.
224. Since they were still in the process of negotiations, the NFL’s unilateral act was considered to be
shielded from antitrust law.
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beyond the ability of antitrust courts to comprehend without truly appreciating the environment of the labor negotiations; a position that is best left
for the NLRB.225 In light of this, the court would have to defer to basic
freedom of contract principles and find that the union’s incorporation of
the Eligibility Rules was a willing acquiescence.226 Therefore, the Eligibility Rules can be considered incorporated into the CBA by reference based
on (1) the CBA’s express incorporation of the Constitution and By-Laws,
and (2) the fact that NFLMC and the NFLPA had been operating under one
form or another of the Eligibility Rules when the CBA was signed and
later renewed.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit clearly points out the fact that the union had the ability to renegotiate the change to the terms of the Constitution and Bylaws made in 2000.227 Explaining that the option not to renegotiate could be considered to be a valid negotiation tactic, Clarett was right
not to read the unions acquiescence of the change as failure of the collective bargaining process.228 Therefore, in addition to being mandatory subjects of bargaining, the Eligibility Rules should be incorporated by reference.
VII. CONCLUSION
In May of 2004, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Clarett
v. National Football League. The court found that the antitrust nonstatutory labor exception applied to the NFL Eligibility Rules. Clarett was
subsequently unable to enter the 2004 draft. The decision by the Second
Circuit was a proper understanding of the law, but was based on a standard
different from that pronounced by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey v. National
Football League. Relying on Brown, the Second Circuit clarified its long
225. See generally Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Assn., 532
F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (providing a judicial hands-off approach to claims which are found to be
captured and addressed in alternative dispute resolutions as provided for by the industry’s collective
bargaining agreement).
226. Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (finding a legal contract where an
exchange of $25 for a debt of $2000 can be consideration because the amorphous value the offer may
have for the acceptor). Silence can be action sufficient to qualify as acceptance. Cole-McIntyreNorfleet Co. v. Holloway, 141 Tenn. 679 (1919) (articulating long held principle that a binding contract
is formed if reasonable for the offeree to infer acceptance from the offeror’s silence and stating that a
noisy and contested negotiation is not the only way for bargaining to occur).
227. See generally Roberts, supra n. 114, at 397-98, 403 (questioning Mackey’s rationale and application regarding the inquiry into bona fide arm’s-length negotiations). The suggestion that there were
no explicit negotiations regarding the Eligibility Rules fails to equate to a negative finding regarding a
bona-fide arm’s- length negotiation.
228. See e.g. id. at 396-97 (stating that courts should not substitute their judgment of fairness for what
parties to a collective bargaining agreement may find to be legitimate).
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held position interpreting national antitrust and labor law and policies and
case precedent to require antitrust courts to defer to the jurisdiction of national labor policies and the NLRB when addressing restraints that exist in
labor markets defined around collective bargaining.
The non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust law, considered by the
Supreme Court to be an area of law to be populated more by confusion
than clarity, is properly explained and applied by the Second Circuit.
Clarett provides a sound explanation of the exemption and properly holds
the NFL Eligibility Rules to be beyond the grasp of Maurice Clarett’s antitrust claims because of the non-statutory labor exemption.229 By interpreting the guidelines from Brown and other Supreme Court precedent, a dual
standard legal regime can exist where antitrust claims which are primarily
focused on labor market are governed by Clarett (applying the nonstatutory labor exemption where the restraint relates to mandatory subject
of bargaining) and where antitrust claims which are primarily focused on
business markets are governed by the three pronged Mackey factors. This
regime will prove to be a useful guide for business and labor of professional sports and other industries on how the non-statutory labor exemption
should be applied.

229. Notably, after being a surprise third round draft pick in the 2005 NFL draft, Clarett participated
in preseason practice before sustaining a groin injury which limited his ability to practice, resulting in
his being released from the Broncos team roster on August 30, 2005. Associated Press, Shanahan,
Broncos moving on after Clarett “mistake”, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2146319
(updated Aug. 30, 2005); Associated Press, Clarett Cut Made Official as Broncos Release 14,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nfl&id=2147226 (updated Aug. 30, 2005).

